What happened to the inventory overhang? by Terry J. Fitzgerald & Jennifer K. Ransom
During the first half of 1997, real out-
put in the U.S. economy expanded at a
robust 4.3 percent annual rate. Despite
such good news, many observers voiced
concern about one characteristic of this
growth: It was accompanied by the
largest six-month increase in business
inventories in 13 years.
Media reports last summer warned that
the inventory buildup might have created
excessive inventory holdings, or an
“inventory overhang.”1  Analysts argued
that such an occurrence would be “a 
significant drag on GDP and production
growth during the second half,” had
“crucial negative implications for the
economy for the rest of 1997,” and meant
that “the economy could weaken signifi-
cantly toward the end of this year and
into next year.”2 The New York Times
characterized the inventory overhang
story as follows:
When goods pile up excessively on
store shelves—and in warehouses
and factory yards—this costly situa-
tion must be redressed sooner or
later. This…means production is cut
back and economic growth sags—
or even disappears.3
One economic interpretation of this story
is that aggregate demand slowed unex-
pectedly in the first half of 1997, while
production remained strong. This re-
sulted in a pileup of inventories. If the
slowdown in aggregate demand was ex-
pected to continue, production would be
cut back not only to bring output in line
with the new lower level of expected de-
mand, but also to run down the undesir-
ably high level of inventory holdings.
This sequence of events might thereby
lead to a recession.
Now, in the spring of 1998, we know that
predictions of a substantial deceleration
in GDP growth were not realized in the
second half of 1997; in fact, real output
expanded at a relatively strong 3.3 per-
cent annual rate. Furthermore, few fore-
casters see a recession in the near future. 
So what happened to the inventory
overhang? Were observers justified in
their concerns about the buildup? If so,
why did the predicted slowdown fail to
materialize?
Why Watch Inventories?
Before addressing “what happened,” it is
helpful to understand why some analysts
and policymakers pay such close atten-
tion to inventories. Their focus is partic-
ularly interesting given that inventory
investment, or the change in business
inventories, is a minor part of total out-
put, averaging only one-half of 1 percent
of real GDP over the postwar period.
The bulk of GDP comprises personal
consumption expenditures (68 percent),
fixed investment (16 percent), and gov-
ernment consumption (18 percent).4
The reason many observers watch inven-
tories closely is that, although the level
of inventory investment is relatively
small, changes in such investment are
not. For example, quarterly movements
in inventory investment over the postwar
period have been, on average, more than
one-third the size of quarterly changes in
real GDP.5  Because policymakers are
typically interested in changes in GDP
and not in the level itself, it is the size of
the changes in the components of GDP
that matters.
Changes in inventory investment during
recessions are notably large. One study
reported that declining inventory invest-
ment accounted for 87 percent of the
drop in aggregate output during the
average postwar recession.6  This has
led some economists to argue that in-
ventory behavior holds the key to un-
derstanding business cycles. 
Last year’s inventory overhang story,
then, can be viewed as an attempt to con-
nect the large buildup of inventories in
the first half of 1997 with the substantial
decline in inventory investment that has
historically accompanied recessions.
Has the Inventory Overhang
Story Held?
One straightforward method of exam-
ining the empirical accuracy of the over-
hang story is to explore whether its pre-
dictions are consistent with historical
relationships in the data. The story’s
fundamental predictions are that periods
of high inventory investment will be
followed by periods of low inventory
investment and slow or negative GDP
growth.
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dictions, we look at semiannual data
from 1950 through 1997. We chose this
frequency because it is consistent with
the media reports that focused on inven-
tory growth during the first half of 1997.
Presumably, quarterly jumps in inven-
tory investment that are immediately
reversed would be less likely to be asso-
ciated with an inventory overhang.
The first prediction—that inventory
investment booms are followed by
inventory investment busts—is not
borne out by the data. In fact, inventory
investment is highly persistent. Periods
of high inventory investment tend to be
followed by more periods of high, rather
than low, inventory investment.
This persistence does not completely
unravel the basic story, however. Recall
that in an accounting sense, it is the
change in inventory investment that
contributes to output growth. And the
level of inventory investment is nega-
tively correlated with future changes in
inventory investment. That is, although
periods of high inventory investment
tend to be followed by more of the
same, the level of inventory investment
tends to decline in subsequent periods.
This results in a negative change in
inventory investment—reason enough
to believe that high inventory invest-
ment may precede low or negative out-
put growth.
The second prediction—that inventory
investment booms are followed by slow
or negative output growth—is not clear-
ly confirmed or rejected by the data. Al-
though the association between current-
period inventory investment and subse-
quent output growth is negative, as the
story predicts, the link is weak.
Figure 1 presents the ratio of inventory
investment to output from 1950 through
1997, with the recession periods shaded.
Two features stand out. First, inventory
investment declines sharply during reces-
sions. Second, periods of high inventory
investment are sometimes followed by
recessions (1960, 1969, 1974), but more
often they are not (1951, 1965–67, 1977,
1984, 1994). In fact, the three periods
with the largest inventory buildups (more
than 1.5 percent of GDP) were not im-
mediately followed by recessions.
Figure 1 appears to provide little sup-
port for the inventory overhang story.
However, it does not include informa-
tion on the rate of output growth follow-
ing inventory investment booms. If out-
put growth were only weakly positive
after those booms not followed by a
recession, the prediction of an economic
slowdown would still hold. Getting to
the bottom of the story clearly requires
further digging.
Has the Story Held?: 
A Closer Look
To better understand the behavior of the
economy following periods of high
inventory investment, we next divide the
postwar data into periods of high inven-
tory investment and all other periods.
High investment periods are defined as
those in which inventory growth over
the previous half year was at least 0.99
percent of GDP—the level attained dur-
ing the first six months of 1997.
We seek to answer two questions. First,
does a clear negative relationship be-
tween inventory investment and future
output growth show up at high levels of
inventory investment? Second, how does
the change in inventory investment con-
tribute to, or detract from, the overall
growth in GDP during and after inven-
tory investment booms?
To address the first question, we plot
current-period inventory investment
against GDP growth one year (two six-
month periods) later (see figure 2). We
chose this timing because it produces
the largest negative correlation (about
–0.2) between inventory investment and
future output growth. The right side of
figure 2 shows that despite the overall
negative correlation, high inventory
investment periods are not clearly asso-
ciated with low levels of future output
growth. In fact, all periods in which
inventory investment clearly exceeded
1.0 percent of output were followed by 
FIGURE 1 INVENTORY INVESTMENT/GDP
FIGURE 2  INVENTORY INVESTMENT VERSUS 
GDP GROWTH, 1950–97
NOTE: Data are semiannual, 1992 chain-weighted dollars. Shaded areas indicate recessions.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
NOTE: Data are semiannual, 1992 chain-weighted dollars.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and U.S. Department
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.periods of positive (sometimes strongly
positive) output growth. Furthermore,
while some periods in which inventory 
investment was roughly 1.0 percent of
GDP were followed by declines in per
capita GDP as large as 4.5 percent, 
others were followed by output growth
of up to 5.5 percent.7
This finding raises another issue. Earlier,
we reported that inventory investment is
negatively associated with future changes
in inventory investment. Thus, we would
expect inventory investment booms to
be followed by a decline in the change 
in inventory investment, one of the 
accounting components that determine
GDP growth. Furthermore, we have
shown that recessions are accompanied
by large declines in this component. 
This brings us back to our second ques-
tion: Why aren’t inventory investment
booms associated with slower GDP
growth? To address this issue, we next
examine the behavior of GDP and its
components during and immediately
after high inventory investment episodes.
Table 1 shows that over the last 25 years,
high inventory investment periods have
been associated with strong GDP
growth. Average output growth during
the subsequent half-year periods remains
above its 25-year mean, and returns to
roughly its long-run mean two periods
(one year) later. 
As expected, the change in inventory
investment contributes substantially (in
an accounting sense) to the high GDP
growth seen during inventory invest-
ment booms. Also as expected, the
change in inventory investment is nega-
tive on average in subsequent periods,
creating a drag on GDP growth. This
negative pull, however, is not large
enough to offset the continued strong
average growth in the other components
of GDP (see table 1).8
What’s Wrong with the Story?
So why aren’t periods of high inventory
investment consistently followed by slow
output growth? One possibility is that
inventory investment booms may result
from factors other than an unexpected
and ominous decline in aggregate de-
mand. Suppose, for example, that firms
experience an unanticipated increase in
productivity or a decrease in costs. Such
“supply-side” shocks could lead to an
inventory buildup as firms produce more
than expected or take advantage of tem-
porarily lower costs. Inventory invest-
ment could also rise because of a belief
that demand will increase in the future,
leading companies to stock up. 
In contrast to the “unexpected decline 
in aggregate demand” rationale, these
alternative reasons for an inventory
investment boom support much more
optimistic views about the economy’s
future performance. Furthermore, there
is reason to believe that productivity
shocks may have played an important
role in at least some high inventory
investment periods. Three of the six
periods included in table 1 were accom-
panied by productivity growth exceed-
ing the 25-year average of roughly 1.2
percent.9  It is also noteworthy that pro-
ductivity growth fell at a 2.3 percent
annual rate during the inventory invest-
ment boom in the second half of 1973.
Those six months marked the only high
inventory investment period in the last
25 years to be immediately followed by
a recession.
What Happened in 1997?
The first half of 1997 also qualifies as 
a high inventory investment period ac-
cording to our definition. So how did the
economy’s behavior in the second half
of last year compare with its perform-
ance following the other postwar inven-
tory investment booms?  
The economy’s behavior in 1997 was
consistent with its average performance
during the earlier high inventory invest-
ment episodes. In the first half of the
year, the inventory investment boom
was accompanied by strong output
growth. In the second half of the year,
output growth remained above average,
despite the expected negative contribu-
tion of inventory investment. 
Supply-side shocks may have contrib-
uted to last year’s inventory investment
boom. Productivity increased at a rela-
tively strong 1.7 percent annual rate in
the first six months of the year. This con-
trasts with the sharp decline in productiv-
ity seen during the second half of 1973,
the last inventory investment boom to be
immediately followed by a recession.
Based on this analysis, it is difficult to
infer much about the behavior of the
economy in 1998. On average, GDP
growth has returned to its postwar aver-
age during the second six-month period
following an inventory investment
boom. This average, however, masks a
great deal of variability. Per capita GDP
fell 4.5 percent after the inventory build-
up in the second half of 1973, but rose
7.0 percent after the boom in the middle
of 1977. 
Making Sense of It All
It is true that output growth generally
slows following inventory investment
booms. This, however, simply reflects
the fact that output growth tends to be
exceptionally strong during these periods.
It is not surprising that output would to
slow toward its long-run average.
The historical data presented here pro-
vide little support for the theory that
high inventory investment periods pre-
cede economic downturns. Inventory
investment booms may instead reflect
positive supply shocks or expected
increases in aggregate demand—hardly
harbingers of bad times. 
a. 1973:IIIQ and IVQ; 1977:IIQ and IIIQ; 1978:IQ and IIQ; 1983:IVQ and 1984:IQ; 1984:IIQ and IIIQ;
and 1994:IQ and IIQ.
b. Percent.
c. Annualized percent change.
d. Includes personal consumption expenditures, fixed investment, government consumption expenditures, and
net exports. “Contribution” is defined here as GDP growth minus the contribution of inventory investment.
NOTE: Data are semiannual, 1992 chain-weighted dollars.  First four columns are averages.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
High 1997 Inventory One Two
Investment Period Periods First Second
1973–97 Periodsa Later Later Half Half
Inventory investment/real GDPb 0.44 1.14 0.94 0.69 0.99 0.84
Per capita GDP growthc 1.16 3.41 1.72 1.02 3.39 2.35
Contribution to GDP growth
Inventory investmentc 0.02 1.03 –0.36 –0.49 1.00 –0.28
All other componentsc,d 1.14 2.38 2.08 1.51 2.39 2.63
TABLE 1 INVENTORY INVESTMENT AND GDP GROWTHThis is not to say that inventory invest-
ment may not provide important clues
about the future performance of the
economy. But until we have a clearly
articulated version of the inventory over-
hang story that incorporates the effects
of different types of disturbances and 
is consistent with prominent features of
the data, we recommend that readers look
elsewhere for their economic forecasts—
and enjoy the current “overhang” for as
long as it lasts.
n n    Footnotes
1.  We treat the terms “excessive inventories”
and “inventory overhang” as shorthand nota-
tion for periods with relatively large inventory
investment. It is not clear that they have any
precise meaning beyond that.
2. Quotations are from The New York Times,
“As Inventories Rise, Will There be a Ripple
Effect?” August 17, 1997; The San Diego
Union–Tribune, “Economy Displays Abiding
Strength,” August 30, 1997; and the Knight–
Ridder/Tribune Business News, “Expect the
Fed to Hold Steady for the Rest of 1997,”
August 18, 1997.
3.  The New York Times, “As Inventories Rise,
Will There Be a Ripple Effect?” (footnote 2).
4. Figures are for 1997. Total exceeds 100
percent because of the negative contribution
of net expoerts to GDP.
5. Here, the volatility of a variable is defined
as the time average of the absolute changes
in that variable, expressed as a percentage of
gross output.
6.  See Alan S. Blinder and Louis J. Maccini,
“The Resurgence of Inventory Research:
What Have We Learned?” Journal of
Economic Surveys, vol. 5, no. 4 (1991),
pp. 291–328.
7. If anything, figure 2 provides support for
an “inventory underhang” story, since low
inventory investment has typically been fol-
lowed by strong output growth. These data
observations are central to the overall nega-
tive association between these variables.
8. One must be careful in interpreting the
numbers in table 1, since the averages mask
tremendous variability in the behavior of
GDP and its components following the high
inventory investment episodes. Furthermore,
the quantitative results are sensitive to the
criterion used in defining periods of high
inventory investment. The qualitative find-
ings reported here still apply, however. 
9. Productivity numbers are for the nonfarm
business sector.
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